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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Plaintiffs in this action challenge the minimum coverage provision of the Affordable Care
Act (“ACA” or “Act”), 26 U.S.C. § 5000A.  That provision regulates the timing and method of
payment for health care services. To uphold the provision, the Court need not make new law or
alter the established allocation of authority between state and federal government. The Court
need only apply longstanding principles recognizing Congressional authority to regulate
economic conduct that substantially affects interstate commerce.
The Affordable Care Act is a comprehensive reform of our national health care system. 
The Act seeks to ameliorate the crisis in the interstate market for health care services that
accounts for more than 17% of the nation’s gross domestic product.  In responding to this crisis,
Congress confronted a market different from any other.  Participation in the market is essentially
universal.  However, unlike other markets with general participation, such as the markets for
food and housing, in the health care market, expenses are often sudden, unpredictable and too
high to be reliably financed out of pocket.  “Most medical expenses for people under 65” result
“from the bolt-from-the-blue event of an accident, a stroke, or a complication of pregnancy that
we know will happen on average but whose victim we cannot (and they cannot) predict well in
advance.”  Expanding Consumer Choice & Addressing “Adverse Selection” Concerns in Health
Insurance: Hearing Before the Joint Economic Comm., 108th Cong. 32 (2004) (statement of
Professor Mark V. Pauly).  Costs can mount rapidly for even the most common significant health
problems.  For example, the average cost of an appendectomy in 2010 was $13,123. 
INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF HEALTH PLANS, 2010 COMPARATIVE PRICE REPORT: MEDICAL
AND HOSPITAL FEES BY COUNTRY, at 14.  The average cost of a day in the hospital was $3,612;
-1-
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of a hospital stay, $14,427; of a Caesarian-section, $13,016; of bypass surgery, $59,770; of an
angioplasty, $29,055.  Id. at 9, 10, 12, 16, 17.  Drug treatment for a common form of cancer costs
more than $150,000 a year.  Neal J. Meropol, et al., Cost of Cancer Care: Issues and
Implications, 25 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 180, 182 (2007).  Thus, the potential for financially
ruinous burdens is plain, but the actuality is unpredictable.
Because of these factors, insurance — a financial instrument — has long been the
primary means of paying for health care services.  In 2009, payments through private health
insurers constituted 32% of national health care spending.  CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVICES (“CMS”), 2009 NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURE DATA, table 3 (2011).  Much of the
balance of health care spending is by federal, state, and local governments.  In particular, the
federal government’s involvement is pervasive.  Federal spending through Medicare and
Medicaid alone in 2009 was around $750 billion, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE (“CBO”),
THE LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK, at 29-30 (2010), and Congress has established numerous
federal tax incentives for employers to finance health care costs.  CBO, KEY ISSUES IN
ANALYZING MAJOR HEALTH PROPOSALS, at 30 (2008).
Notwithstanding these expenditures, about 18.8% of the non-elderly population
(approximately 50 million people) had no health insurance in 2009.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2009, at 23, table 8.
These people nonetheless actively participate in the interstate health care market, consuming over
$100 billion of health care services annually.  FAMILIES USA FOUND., HIDDEN HEALTH TAX:
AMERICANS PAY A PREMIUM 2 (2009) (“FAMILIES USA, HIDDEN HEALTH TAX”) ($116 billion in
2008); see also, e.g., CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (“CDC”), NATIONAL
-2-
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CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2009, at 318 table 80 (2010) (80%
of those without insurance at some point during a 12-month period visited a doctor or emergency
room at least once); CDC, NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, EMERGENCY
DEPARTMENT VISITORS AND VISITS: WHO USED THE EMERGENCY ROOM IN 2007? 2 (2010) (20%
of uninsured adults aged 18-44 visited the emergency room in 2007).
A further distinguishing attribute of the health care market is that people receive, and
expect to receive, expensive health care services in times of need without regard to their ability to
pay.  For decades, state and federal laws have required emergency rooms to stabilize any patient
who arrives with an emergency condition, regardless of whether the person has insurance or
otherwise can pay.  Congress found that, in 2008, the cost of uncompensated health care for the
uninsured — i.e., care not paid for by the patient or a third party, and thus borne, in the first
instance, by health care providers — was $43 billion.  42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(F); see also
FAMILIES USA, HIDDEN HEALTH TAX at 2, 6.  Congress further found that health care providers
pass on much of these costs “to private insurers, which pass on the cost to families,” increasing
average premiums for insured families by “over $1,000 a year.”  42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(F); see
also FAMILIES USA, HIDDEN HEALTH TAX at 2, 6.
Many of the uninsured want insurance but cannot obtain it because of their medical
conditions or history.  A recent national survey estimated that insurers denied or limited
coverage, or charged a higher rate, to 9 million non-elderly adults — 35% of those who tried to
purchase health insurance in the individual insurance market in the previous three years —
because of a pre-existing condition.  HELP ON THE HORIZON: FINDINGS FROM THE
COMMONWEALTH FUND BIENNIAL HEALTH INSURANCE SURVEY OF 2010, at xi (2011). Others,
-3-
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however, could obtain insurance, but “make an economic and financial decision” to “attempt to
self-insure.”  42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(A).  That decision profoundly affects the interstate market.
Congress addressed these problems comprehensively in the Affordable Care Act.  The
Act increases the availability of insurance coverage through premium tax credits, the expansion
of Medicaid, and the creation of insurance Exchanges.  26 U.S.C. § 36B; 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII), 18031, 18081.  It also regulates the insurance industry — barring
insurers from denying insurance, or charging more for coverage, because of a person’s medical
history or condition.  42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg, 300gg-1, 300gg-3, 300gg-4(a).  And,  in furtherance of
these consumer protections, so as not to “undercut [this] Federal regulation of the health
insurance market,” id. § 18091(a)(2)(H), the Act requires most individuals to maintain a
minimum level of insurance or pay a tax penalty.  26 U.S.C. § 5000A.
In enacting this minimum coverage provision, Congress made detailed findings that
establish a foundation for the exercise of its commerce power.  Congress found that the provision
–  which regulates how people pay for services in the interstate health care market — “regulates
activity that is commercial and economic in nature,” 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(A), and that health
insurance “is sold in interstate commerce” and “pays for medical supplies, drugs, and equipment
that are shipped in interstate commerce,” id. § 18091(a)(2)(B).  Congress also found that the
consumption of health care without insurance has substantial adverse effects on the interstate
health care market, id. § 18091(a)(2)(F); and that the minimum coverage provision is “essential”
to the Act’s  reforms that prevent insurers from denying coverage because of an individual’s
medical condition or history,  id. § 18091(a)(2)(I).
In the face of these uncontroverted findings, plaintiffs, two individuals who participate in
-4-
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the interstate health care market, raise a facial challenge to the Act’s minimum coverage
provision. Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 43, 71-72, ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs say that they prefer to
continue paying for health care out of pocket rather than through insurance because it is “more
cost effective.” Id. ¶ 42.  Yet plaintiffs disclose that their disposable income, after their
anticipated purchase of a new car, would be between $840 and $1320 per year – an amount that
is unlikely to suffice should any member of their family of four require more than minimal
medical care. See Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts Pursuant to Local Rule
56.1 (“SMF,” attached hereto) ¶¶ 5-6, 45-47; U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (“HHS”),
ASPE RESEARCH BRIEF, THE VALUE OF HEALTH INSURANCE: FEW OF THE UNINSURED HAVE
ADEQUATE RESOURCES TO PAY POTENTIAL HOSPITAL BILLS (“ASPE RESEARCH BR.”), at 1
(2011) (finding that most uninsured families, even those with incomes above 400% of the federal
poverty level, cannot afford to pay their hospital bills).  Absent the Affordable Care Act,
plaintiffs risk finding themselves unable to pay for medical care they receive, contributing to the
$43 billion in costs that are shifted every year to others in the national health care market. 
Effective regulation requires, and the Commerce Clause permits, Congress to anticipate and
prevent such problems rather than react to them after the fact.   
Plaintiffs cannot deny that Congress has the power to regulate conduct that has substantial
effects on interstate commerce, or that Congress has the power to adopt measures that it
determines to be essential to the success of a larger regulation of interstate commerce.  Ignoring
Congress’s legitimate objectives, plaintiffs challenge its choice of means to achieve them.  But it
has been long established that the courts are not free to override Congress’s judgment as to the
appropriate means to accomplish its legitimate goals.  In the Affordable Care Act’s minimum
-5-
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coverage provision, Congress made a more than rational choice tailored to the unique features of
the interstate health care market and the role of insurance in that market.  That should end the
inquiry.
The minimum coverage provision is valid for an additional reason.  Congress has
independent authority to enact 26 U.S.C. § 5000A as an exercise of its power under the General
Welfare Clause of Article I, Section 8.  Congress treated the minimum coverage provision as an
exercise of the taxing power, lodging it in the Internal Revenue Code, specifying that the penalty
under the provision be assessed and collected like any other tax, providing that taxpayers filing a
joint return are jointly liable, using the word “tax” or some derivation of it dozens of times in the
provision, and invoking the taxing power throughout the legislative debates.  The provision,
moreover, bears the principal hallmark of a tax.  It will raise revenue, and is therefore valid under
longstanding precedent, even though Congress also had a regulatory purpose in enacting it.  
The material undisputed facts underlying Congress’s legislative judgment are set forth in
the accompanying Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, attached hereto and incorporated
herein. These facts establish, as a matter of law, Congress’s rational basis for concluding that the
minimum coverage provision regulates conduct that has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce and that the provision is essential to the Act’s insurance reforms.  Congress’s
enactment of 26 U.S.C. § 5000A therefore falls well within its authority to adopt measures that
are necessary and proper to the regulation of interstate commerce.  The record also shows that the
provision falls within Congress’s power to tax and spend in furtherance of the general welfare. 
Plaintiffs may dispute the policy judgments that Congress made in enacting the Affordable Care
Act.  But those judgments are reserved to the legislators elected to make them.  In our democratic
-6-
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system, there is a strong presumption that those judgments are constitutional.  Plaintiffs do not
and cannot overcome that presumption.  The government is therefore entitled to summary
judgment.   
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Secretary moves for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.  A court should grant summary judgment where “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
see Tri-M Group, LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 415 (3d Cir. 2011).  This case presents a pure
question of law – whether Congress acted within its Article I powers in enacting the Affordable
Care Act’s minimum coverage provision.  Plaintiffs face a heavy burden to show that Congress
exceeded its constitutional authority.  “[C]ongressional acts are entitled to a ‘presumption of
constitutionality,’ and will only be invalidated upon a ‘plain showing that Congress has exceeded
its constitutional bounds.’” United States v. Whited, 311 F.3d 259, 266 -67 (3d Cir. 2002)
(quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000)).  This presumption is “‘not a mere
polite gesture’” but reflects the substantial deference that a court owes the “‘deliberate judgment
by constitutional majorities of the two Houses of Congress that an Act is within their delegated
power.’”  Id. (quoting United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 449 (1953)). 
Moreover, plaintiffs bring a facial challenge to the minimum coverage provision.  To
prevail, plaintiffs must establish that “‘no set of circumstances exists’” under which the provision
would be valid, “‘i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications.’”  United States v.
Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008).  Unless plaintiffs can meet this heavy burden,
-7-
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defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
ARGUMENT
I. THE MINIMUM COVERAGE PROVISION IS A PROPER EXERCISE OF
CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO REGULATE
INTERSTATE COMMERCE
A. The Minimum Coverage Provision Regulates Payment for Health Care
Services, a Class of Economic Activity That Substantially Affects Interstate
Commerce
The Constitution grants Congress the power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the
several States,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper” to the execution of that power, id. cl. 18.  This grant of authority allows Congress not
only to regulate the channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, but also to address
other conduct that “substantially affect[s] interstate commerce.”  Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1,
16-17 (2005).  In assessing those substantial effects, Congress’s focus is necessarily on the
aggregate impact of a particular class of conduct.  Congress  need not predict whether and to
what extent a particular individual in the class will contribute to that aggregate effect.  Id. at 22;
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942); see also United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569,
584 (3d Cir. 1995).  
A Court’s task in reviewing the validity of legislation enacted under the commerce power
“is a modest one.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 22.  The Court “need not determine” whether the regulated
activities, “taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only
whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.”  Id.  This deferential standard reflects both
Congress’s superior capacity to make empirical judgments and operational choices and the
appropriate structural separation between the judicial and legislative powers.  The courts owe
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“Congress’ findings deference in part because the institution is far better equipped than the
judiciary to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing upon legislative questions.”
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) (internal quotation omitted).  “This is
not the sum of the matter, however.”  Id.  The courts “owe Congress’ findings an additional
measure of deference out of respect for its authority to exercise the legislative power,” lest a
court “infringe on traditional legislative authority to make predictive judgments when enacting
nationwide regulatory policy.”  Id.  Accordingly, in the context of a Commerce Clause challenge,
this Court’s task is to conduct a “narrow” inquiry into “whether Congress had a ‘rational basis’
for concluding that the activity it was regulating . . . was sufficiently related to interstate
commerce to support the statute’s constitutionality.”  Whited, 311 F.3d at 267.
The record supports Congress’s express findings that the minimum coverage provision
“regulates activity that is commercial and economic in nature,” 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(A), and
has an enormous impact on interstate commerce.  First, the provision addresses the consumption
of health care services without paying for them, an activity that shifts billions of dollars of costs
annually to other participants in the interstate health care market.  42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(F). 
These shifted expenses spread across state lines because many insurance companies operate in
multiple states.  42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(B).  Second, the provision is instrumental to the ACA’s
guaranteed issue and community rating reforms, which guarantee that individuals will not be
denied insurance because of illness or accident, and will not have to pay higher premiums based
on their health or medical history.  42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(I), (J). 
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1. The minimum coverage provision regulates the practice of obtaining
health care without insurance, a practice that shifts health care costs
to other participants in the health care market
Without question, the market for health care services is an interstate market.  Indeed, the
Third Circuit has already recognized that “the health care industry’s troubling afflictions simply
are not confined by the jurisdictional boundaries that divide Federal, State and local health care
finance,” and that “[t]he relationships among patients, providers, and insurers are extraordinarily
complex.”  Whited, 311 F.3d at 269 (internal quotation omitted).  There is no doubt, furthermore,
that Americans, whether or not they have health insurance, visit doctors and seek medical
treatment  See SMF ¶¶ 19-20.  Because health care is so expensive that most uninsured
individuals cannot afford to pay for all the care they receive, however, the uninsured, as a class,
do not bear the full cost of their participation in the health care market, instead passing
significant costs on to others.  Id. ¶¶ 20-23.  Congress’s express statutory findings quantify the
effect of this cost-shifting on interstate commerce: the uninsured received $43 billion in medical
care that they did not pay for in 2008 alone.  42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(F).   Congress’s findings1
also describe how this activity affects the interstate health care market; the costs of care that the
uninsured receive are passed from providers “to private insurers, which pass on the cost to
families” in a direct way, by inflating their insurance premiums “by an average of over $1,000 a
year.”   Id.; see also FAMILIES USA, HIDDEN HEALTH TAX, at 2, 6.  “In short, those who choose
not to purchase health insurance will ultimately get a ‘free ride’ on the backs of those Americans
While Congress is not obligated to make findings to support its exercise of the1
commerce power when enacting legislation, where it does so, these findings “may provide
independent support for a determination of constitutionality, and may also serve to indicate
whether Congress had a rational basis for concluding that the activity being regulated was
sufficiently related to interstate commerce.”  Whited, 311 F.3d at 269.
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who have made responsible choices to provide for the illness we all must face at some point in
our lives.”  Mead v. Holder, No. 10-950, -- F. Supp. 2d --, 2011 WL 611139, at *16 n.10 (D.D.C.
Feb. 22, 2011), appeal pending, No. 11-5047 (D.C. Cir.).
“The decision whether to purchase insurance or to attempt to pay for health care out of
pocket, is plainly economic.”  Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 893 (E.D.
Mich. 2010), appeal pending, No. 10-2388 (6th Cir.).  And because people without insurance, as
a class, do not pay for all the health care they consume, these economic decisions “have clear and
direct impacts on health care providers, taxpayers, and the insured population who ultimately pay
for the care provided to those who go without insurance.”  Id.  
Undoubtedly, not every uninsured person will shift health care costs to others in any
given year.  But millions will do so each year, and the cumulative impact of such cost-shifting is
to impose a multi-billion dollar annual burden on interstate commerce.  Supreme Court precedent
makes clear that the validity of a regulation under the Commerce Clause does not turn on a
specific person’s actual conduct or circumstance.  Nor does Congress have to wait until an
individual engages in particular conduct and then try to deal with the consequences.  Rather,
Congress can exercise its commerce power to address the aggregate effect of a class of conduct,
taking into account the “likelihood” that a particular activity will impact the relevant interstate
market, given the way that particular market operates.  Raich, 545 U.S. at 19. In that way,
Congress has authority to prevent an individual from contributing to the consequences that it has,
in its legislative judgment, predicted might occur, absent regulation.  See Turner Broad Sys., Inc.,
520 U.S. at 196 (“courts must accord substantial deference to the predictive judgments of
Congress”).  
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Thus, in Wickard and Raich, the Court did not examine whether any particular plaintiff’s
consumption of home-grown wheat or home-grown marijuana, respectively, had any impact at all
on the interstate markets for those commodities; the important point, in Wickard, was that “rising
market prices could draw [home-grown] wheat into the interstate market, resulting in lower
market prices.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 18 (emphasis added) (citing Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128).  The
parallel concern in Raich was “the likelihood that the high demand in the interstate market will
draw [home-grown] marijuana into that market.”  Id. (emphasis added).  In both cases, the Court
recognized that these market probabilities could rationally lead Congress to conclude that the
conduct at issue, “when viewed in the aggregate,” would, if left unregulated, have a substantial
impact on the interstate markets.  Id. at 19 (citing Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128). 
Here, plaintiffs acknowledge that they participate in the health care market but claim that,
so far, since choosing to forego insurance, they have been able to pay all medical expenses they
have incurred.  Compl. ¶ 43.  That plaintiffs have been lucky so far has no bearing on the
constitutional question before the Court.  Indeed, given plaintiffs’ contention that, absent the
minimum coverage provision, they would buy a new car, leaving them with between $840 and
$1320 per year in disposable income, id. ¶¶ 58-66, the rational observer would likely have grave
doubts that plaintiffs could pay medical expenses out of pocket if either they or their children
were to require significant medical treatment, and would conclude that plaintiffs could well end
up shifting their health care costs to others if they continue to go without insurance.  
Given plaintiffs’ own description of their circumstances, plaintiffs cannot deny that the
risks attendant to obtaining health care without insurance apply to them as well as others in the
health care market. Regardless of their own circumstances, however, plaintiffs cannot deny that
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the practice of obtaining health care without insurance, viewed in the aggregate, has clear and
direct impacts on health care providers, taxpayers, and the insured population who ultimately pay
for the medical care that the uninsured receive.  Congress does not have to predict, person-by-
person, who among the uninsured will receive medical services and fail to pay in a given year. 
As a class, people who forego insurance and attempt to “self-insure” pose a threat to the
interstate health care services market.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that where
“Congress decides that the ‘total incidence’ of a practice,” – here, the practice of attempting to
pay for health care without insurance – “poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the
entire class.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 17 (quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154-155
(1971)).
2. The minimum coverage provision is essential to the Act’s guaranteed
issue and community rating insurance reforms
The minimum coverage provision is also valid Commerce Clause legislation because it
“operates as an essential part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme,” which requires that
insurers extend coverage and set premiums without regard to pre-existing medical conditions or
medical history.  Thomas More, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 894.  Congress’s “guaranteed issue” and
“community rating” regulations of the health insurance industry are, without question, valid
exercises of its commerce power.  See Whited, 311 F.3d at 268 (“Given the complex state of
modern health care delivery, it is difficult to envision any public or private health care plan or
contract that does not affect commerce.”).  And learning from the experience of state regulators,
Congress recognized that these insurance industry regulations could not succeed if participants in
the health care market could wait to buy insurance until an acute medical need arises.  SMF ¶¶
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37-43.  Congress accordingly concluded that its failure to include a minimum coverage
requirement “would leave a gaping hole” in the regulatory scheme.  Raich, 545 U.S. at 22.  Thus,
even if the means of payment for health care services were not regarded as “commercial,”
Congress may properly regulate based on its conclusion that the “failure to regulate that class of
activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market[.]”  Id. at 18; see also id. at 37-38
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
Although crucial to a consumer’s ability to pay for health care services, affordable health
insurance is in increasingly short supply.  SMF ¶¶ 16-18, 24.  For example, between 1999 and
2010, average premiums for employer-sponsored family coverage increased 138 percent.  KAISER
FAMILY FOUND., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS 2010 ANNUAL SURVEY 31, tbl 1.11 (2010). 
These “[p]remium increases are driving people out of the insurance market.”  47 Million and
Counting: Why the Health Care Marketplace Is Broken: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Fin., 110th Cong. 49 (2008) (Prof. Hall).  As a result, between 2000 and 2009, the portion of the
non-Medicare-eligible population covered by private insurance slipped from about 3/4 to about
2/3.  John Holahan, The 2007-09 Recession and Health Insurance Coverage, 30 HEALTH
AFFAIRS 145, 148 (2011).  More than 50 million Americans went without insurance in 2009.
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED
STATES: 2009, at 23, table 8. 
As described in defendants’ statement of material facts, these trends are largely due to an
insurance industry screening process known as “medical underwriting,” a practice that makes
health insurance difficult or impossible to obtain for the 50 to 129 million non-elderly Americans
who have at least one pre-existing medical condition.  SMF ¶¶ 16-18.  The Act addresses this
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problem by barring insurance companies from denying coverage or setting premiums based on an
individual’s medical condition or history.  42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg, 300gg-1, 300gg-3, 300gg-4(a). 
But these guaranteed-issue and community-rating requirements would not work in a regulatory
scheme that permits health care consumers to time their insurance purchases.  Indeed, a “health
insurance market could never survive or even form if people could buy their insurance on the
way to the hospital.”  47 Million and Counting, 110th Cong. 52 (Prof. Hall).
Congress found that, absent the minimum coverage provision, “many individuals would
wait to purchase health insurance until they needed care.”  42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(I). 
Accordingly, Congress concluded, the minimum coverage requirement “is essential to creating
effective health insurance markets that do not require underwriting and eliminate its associated
administrative costs.” Id. § 18091(a)(2)(J).  The legislative record demonstrated that the absence
of a minimum coverage requirement had undermined guaranteed issue and community rating
reform efforts in states such as New Jersey and New York.  SMF ¶¶ 40-41.  In these
circumstances, many consumers “will go without insurance when they are healthy, but then have
the privilege of throwing themselves on the mercy of community-rated premiums when they fall
ill.”  Making Health Care Work for American Families: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, Subcomm. on Health, 111th Cong. at 11 (2009) (Prof. Reinhardt).  This in turn
causes premiums to go up, which results in still fewer people getting health insurance. 
Describing the results of the New Jersey reforms, Professor Reinhardt explained that “[i]t is well
known that community-rating and guaranteed issue, coupled with voluntary insurance, tends to
lead to a death spiral of individual insurance.”  Id.; see also Alan C. Monheit et al., Community
Rating & Sustainable Individual Health Insurance Markets in New Jersey, 23 HEALTH AFFAIRS
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167, 168 (2004).  
In the wake of similar legislation enacted in New York, there was “a dramatic exodus of
indemnity insurers from New York’s individual market.”  Mark Hall, An Evaluation of New
York’s Reform Law, 25 J. HEALTH POLITICS, POL’Y & LAW 71, 91-92 (2000).  And when Maine
enacted similar legislation, most health insurers withdrew from the state.  Health Reform in the
21st Century: Insurance Market Reforms: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means,
111th Cong. 117 (2009) (letter of Phil Caper, M.D. and Joe Lendvai).
In contrast, Congress found that Massachusetts avoided some of these perils by enacting a
minimum coverage provision as part of its broader insurance reforms.  That provision “has
strengthened private employer-based coverage: despite the economic downturn, the number of
workers offered employer-based coverage has actually increased.”  42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(D). 
But Massachusetts itself attests that the “interstate flow of patients (including uninsured patients)
[illustrates] that individual states cannot effectively account for, let alone mitigate, the impact of
healthcare trends felt on the national and interstate levels.”  Amicus Br. of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts in Support of Appellant, State of Florida et al. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., No. 11-11021 (11  Cir. filed Apr. 11, 2011), at 13.  The record thus fully supports theth
Congressional finding that, given the national insurance reforms that it sought to make, a
nationwide minimum coverage provision “is essential to creating effective health insurance
markets in which improved health insurance products that are guaranteed issue and do not
exclude coverage of pre-existing conditions can be sold.”  42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(I).  Because
“it is rational to believe the failure to regulate the uninsured would undercut the Act’s larger
regulatory scheme for the interstate health care market,” the minimum coverage provision is well
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within Congress’s commerce power.  Liberty Univ. Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 634
(W.D. Va. 2010), appeal pending, No. 10-2347 (4th Cir.); see also Whited, 311 F.3d at 268
(upholding Congress’s Commerce Clause authority to impose criminal penalties on local health
care embezzlement when the provision was “just one of a number of broad measures Congress
enacted in its effort to combat waste, fraud, and abuse in health insurance and health care
delivery”).
B. The Minimum Coverage Provision Is a Necessary and Proper Means of
Regulating Interstate Commerce 
1. Courts accord broad deference to the means adopted by Congress to
advance legitimate regulatory goals 
Plaintiffs have not disputed Congress’s conclusion that, in general, people who obtain
health care services without insurance shift substantial costs to other market participants.  Nor
have they disputed the notion that the minimum coverage provision is essential to the Affordable
Care Act’s broader regulatory scheme.  Nor has any court concluded that Congress’s findings
were irrational.  Instead, plaintiffs and others who have opposed the minimum coverage
provision complain of the means that Congress chose to regulate payment in the interstate market
for health care services.  No proper basis exists, however, to override Congress’s judgment about
the appropriate means to achieve its legitimate regulatory objectives.
“The Federal ‘government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers,’” but
“at the same time, ‘a government, entrusted with such’ powers ‘must also be entrusted with
ample means for their execution.’”  United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010)
(quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405, 408 (1819)).  Accordingly, “where Congress
has the authority to enact a regulation of interstate commerce, ‘it possesses every power needed
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to make that regulation effective.’”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 118-19 (1942)).
Thus, “the relevant inquiry” under the Necessary and Proper Clause “‘is simply “whether
the means chosen are reasonably adapted to the attainment of a legitimate end under the
commerce power” or under other powers that the Constitution grants Congress the authority to
implement.’”  United States v. Pendleton, 636 F.3d 78, 87 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Comstock, 130
S. Ct. at 1957 (quoting Raich, 545 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment))).  “[I]n
determining whether the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the legislative authority to
enact a particular federal statute,” the Court asks “whether the statute constitutes a means that is
rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.”  Comstock, 130
S. Ct. at 1956 (citing Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004); Raich, 545 U.S. at 22;
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995); and Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981)); see also United States v. Keresty, 465 F.2d
36, 42 (3d Cir. 1972) (court’s only role is to address “whether the means [Congress] selected to
eliminate th[e] evil [it legitimately sought to address] are reasonable”).
2. The minimum coverage requirement is plainly adapted to the unique
conditions of the market for health care services
The means chosen by Congress to effectuate the Affordable Care Act’s regulatory goals
are closely tailored to the unique features of the market for health care services.  SMF ¶¶ 3-18. 
Participation in this market is essentially universal.  The need for medical treatment may arise
unexpectedly, and is not a matter of choice.  The cost of care, absent insurance, may overwhelm
the typical family budget.  And – unlike in other markets – individuals can expect to receive
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expensive medical services without regard to their ability to pay.  
A government requirement to purchase insurance in order to avoid the externalization of
costs is hardly novel.  Indeed, insurance requirements are commonplace in the United States
Code.  See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 13906(a)(1) (interstate motor carriers).  In the case of vehicle
insurance, the requirement typically coincides with the obligation to register one’s automobile. 
But while it is sensible for the government to make automobile insurance a condition for use of
the highways, it would be entirely unacceptable to impose a similar requirement on the use of an
emergency room.  For, although “society feels no obligation to repair” the Porsche of the
uninsured motorist, nonetheless “[i]f a man is struck down by a heart attack in the street,
Americans will care for him whether or not he has insurance,” even if that means “more prudent
citizens end up paying the tab.”  Stuart Butler, The Heritage Lectures 218: Assuring Affordable
Health Care for All Americans, at 6.
Even before the enactment of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
(“EMTALA”) in 1986, state courts and legislatures had responded to the changing role of private
hospitals and of emergency rooms by creating tort liability for the failure to provide emergency
services.  The common law has evolved to preclude hospitals from turning away patients with
emergency needs because they will be unable to pay for services.  The modern rule is that
“liability on the part of the hospital may be predicated on the refusal of service to a patient in
case of an unmistakable emergency.”  Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135, 140
(Del. 1961).  In addition to “state court rulings impos[ing] a common law duty on doctors and
hospitals to provide necessary emergency care,” by 1985 “at least 22 states [had] enacted statutes
or issued regulations requiring the provision of limited medical services whenever an emergency
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situation exists[.]”  H.R. REP. NO. 99-241, pt. III, at 5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 726, 727;
see also 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 449.8(a) (declaring that “as a continuing condition of
licensure, each provider should offer and provide medically necessary, lifesaving and emergency
health care services to every person in this Commonwealth, regardless of financial status or
ability to pay”).
These measures were not adequate, however, to prevent hospitals from diverting patients
or discharging them prematurely.  Congress thus enacted EMTALA “based on concerns that, for
economic reasons, hospitals either were refusing to treat certain emergency room patients [who
did not have insurance], or were improperly transferring such patients to other institutions (that
is, ‘patient dumping’).”  Byrne v. Cleveland Clinic,  684 F. Supp. 2d 641, 650 (E.D. Pa. 2010)
(citing Torretti v. Main Line Hosps., Inc., 580 F.3d 168, 173 (3d Cir. 2009)); cf. H.R. REP. NO.
99-241, pt. 1, at 27 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 42, 605.  The federal statute
augmented the duties imposed under state law by requiring all hospitals that participate in
Medicare and offer emergency services to stabilize anyone entering the emergency room with an
emergency condition without regard to ability to pay.  42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.  Of course, after these
individuals are stabilized, they are billed, and people may then go into debt or be driven into
bankruptcy as a result of this or other expensive treatment, and any unpaid expenses are shifted
elsewhere in the market. SMF ¶¶ 20-24.
Congress properly adapted the minimum coverage provision to these practical realities of
the national health care market.  Most significantly, as noted, with health insurance, timing is
critical.  The societal judgment reflected in both EMTALA and the common law is that it would
be unconscionable to deny emergency medical care to someone without insurance.  Congress
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therefore could not ethically have tied an insurance requirement to the availability of medical
care at the time it is received.  Nor could such a requirement work as a practical matter, given the
risk that even individuals who had insurance might be turned away at the emergency room door
if they were required to present proof of insurance and did not happen to have it on their person. 
Moreover, from a purely economic standpoint, a health insurance market could never survive “if
people could simply buy their insurance on the way to the hospital.”  47 Million and Counting,
110th Cong. 14 (statement of Prof. Hall).  To be practical and ethical, a requirement to obtain
medical insurance must therefore apply before the medical services are actually needed.
3. Congress can regulate participants in the national health care market,
even if they do not currently maintain insurance coverage 
Plaintiffs’ claim is that Congress may not force an ostensibly passive individual to
purchase insurance.  Compl. ¶¶ 13-15.  Their claim disregards the nature of the regulatory
scheme that Congress enacted.  Plaintiffs cannot dispute that “the individuals subject to [the
minimum coverage provision] are either present or future participants in the national health care
market.”  Mead, 2011 WL 611139, at *18.  In fact, plaintiffs admit, as they must, that they
themselves participate in this market.  Compl. ¶ 43.  Congress may regulate the conduct of
participants in the health care market, even if at a given moment those participants are not signed
up to finance their health care expenses through insurance.
Plaintiffs’ theory restates arguments that have been repeatedly rejected by the Supreme
Court.  In Raich, the Court upheld the application of the Controlled Substances Act to the
possession of marijuana that was grown at home for personal use.  The Supreme Court found it
irrelevant that the plaintiffs were not engaged in commercial activity and that they did not buy,
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sell, or distribute any portion of the marijuana that they possessed.  The regulation was proper,
the Court held, because “Congress had a rational basis for concluding that leaving
home-consumed marijuana outside federal control would . . . affect price and market conditions.” 
Raich, 545 U.S. at 19.  And that rational basis did not rest on the plaintiffs’ own conduct but on
the market’s structural forces that created a “likelihood” that the plaintiffs would be drawn into
an interstate market regardless of their stated intent.  Id. at 18.  Under that structure, the
plaintiffs’ marijuana was “never more than an instant from the interstate market.”  Id. at 40
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).  In the aggregate, the failure to regulate home consumption
such as the plaintiffs’ would have a “substantial effect on supply and demand in the national
market for that commodity.”  Id. at 19.
Raich reflected principles established more than half a century earlier in Wickard, 317
U.S. 111 (1942), which upheld the federal regulation of wheat that was grown and consumed on
a family farm as part of a program to control the volume and price of wheat moving in interstate
commerce.  The Supreme Court sustained that exercise of the commerce power even though the
wheat at issue was not “sold or intended to be sold,” id. at 119, even though the home
consumption of wheat by any individual “may be trivial by itself,” id. at 127, and even though the
regulation “forc[ed] some farmers into the market to buy what they could provide for
themselves,” id. at 129.  In Keresty, the Third Circuit similarly deferred to Congress’s
determination that extortionate credit transactions “intrinsically affect interstate commerce,” and
recognized that there need be no actual showing that a particular “purely intrastate extortionate
extension of credit” affects interstate commerce.  Keresty, 465 F.2d at 42.  Moreover, even after
Lopez, the Third Circuit upheld a federal ban on intrastate possession of a machine gun because
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the ban was an essential part of Congress’s larger regulation of interstate machine gun
trafficking.  United States v. Swida, 180 F. Supp. 2d 652, 658 (M.D. Pa. 2002) (discussing
United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 1996)); see also United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d
465, 474 (3d Cir. 1999) (upholding federal ban on intrastate possession of child pornography
where Congress was attempting to “close a loophole” in its existing statutory scheme).
“While the unique nature of the market for health care and the breadth of the Act present
a novel set of facts for consideration, the well-settled principles expounded in Raich and Wickard
control the disposition of this claim.”  Liberty Univ. Inc., 753 F. Supp. 2d at 633.  The plaintiffs
in Raich and Wickard could not exempt themselves from regulation by declaring themselves to
be “inactive” in a market, where the category of behavior that they were engaged in had concrete
effects on the larger interstate market.  Similarly, the claim that an uninsured individual is
“inactive” ignores that health insurance is not a stand-alone consumer product, but instead is the
principal means of financing participation in the health care market.  “Regardless of whether one
relies on an insurance policy, one’s savings, or the backstop of free or reduced-cost emergency
room services, one has made a choice regarding the method of payment for the health care
services one expects to receive.”  Liberty Univ. Inc., 753 F. Supp. 2d at 633.  
Even if the uninsured population does not currently participate in the health insurance
market (though any given individual likely had or will have insurance in the near past or future),
it indisputably participates in the larger market for health care services.  Thus, plaintiffs’
assertion “that the Commerce Clause power does not extend to regulations which require
individuals to enter a market they would otherwise choose to remain outside of is irrelevant to
this case.”  Mead, 2011 WL 611139, at *19.  Nothing required Congress to focus exclusively on
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the submarket that plaintiffs define, and nothing barred Congress from focusing on economic
conduct in the health care market.  Some individuals may prefer to pay for their participation in
that larger market out of pocket rather than through insurance.  But that type of economic
preference is plainly subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause.  Congress had a rational
basis to conclude that the uninsured shift billions of dollars annually on to other market
participants when they use health care services for which they cannot fully pay.  Under this
“common sense understanding of the [market] forces” at issue, Congress has the authority to
regulate.  See Rodia, 194 F.3d at 478 (upholding federal ban on intrastate possession of child
pornography based on court’s recognition of the nexus between the regulated intrastate behavior
and the interstate market). 
Moreover, the uninsured population benefits directly from the Act’s regulatory reforms. 
As noted, the Act prohibits insurers from denying coverage, or charging more, for persons with
pre-existing conditions.  42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg, 300gg-1, 300gg-3, 300gg-4(a).  The Act makes
everyone insurable, and thus provides tangible protection against the risk of being left destitute
by catastrophic medical expenses.  See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(G) (62% of all personal
bankruptcies are caused in part by medical expenses).  Even apart from the other rational bases
for Congress’s choice of means, “[t]his benefit makes imposing the minimum coverage provision
appropriate.”  Thomas More, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 894.
Plaintiffs’ theory – that conduct can be exempted from federal regulation simply by
attaching the label of “inactivity” or “consumption” to that conduct – disregards the “broad
principles of economic practicality” that underlie the commerce power.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 571
(Kennedy, J., concurring).  The Court has long held that “questions of the power of Congress are
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not to be decided by reference to any formula which would give controlling force to
nomenclature” without regard to “the actual effects of the activity in question upon interstate
commerce.”  Wickard, 317 U.S. at 120; see also Swift Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398
(1905) (“commerce among the states is not a technical legal conception, but a practical one,
drawn from the course of business”); cf. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,  370 U.S. 294,
336-337 (1962) (Congress chose in the Clayton Act to “prescribe[] a pragmatic, factual approach
to the definition of the relevant market and not a formal, legalistic one”).  Indeed, the Supreme
Court has expressly rejected the relevance of any distinction between “production” and
“consumption” for purposes of Commerce Clause analysis.  Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124.
Moreover, plaintiffs’ “inactivity” fallacy not only ignores Congress’s considered
judgment but also entirely contradicts both logic and common sense.  After all, if the uninsured
were truly “passive” with respect to the relevant market, they could not shift costs to others
through their participation in that market.  It is the conduct of the uninsured, due to their
participation in the health care market, that Congress identified as having a substantial economic
effect, due to the significant amount of uncompensated care that the uninsured receive, which
shifts costs to others and drives up prices of both health care services and health insurance
premiums.  42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(F).  The “market reality” is that “[h]ow participants in the
health care services market pay for such services has a documented impact on interstate
commerce.”  Thomas More, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 894.  Congress plainly has the authority to
regulate conduct that has substantial economic effects in the interstate market with which it is
concerned.
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4. Congress’s rational basis for enacting the Affordable Care Act does
not depend upon attenuated links to interstate commerce  
In prior briefing, plaintiffs have relied on the holdings of Lopez and Morrison, the only
modern cases to invalidate federal statutes as beyond the commerce power.  Both statutes were
stand-alone measures that involved no economic regulation.  In Lopez, the Supreme Court struck
down a ban on possession of a handgun in a school zone because the ban was related to
economic activity only insofar as the presence of guns near schools might impair learning, which
in turn might undermine economic productivity.  Similarly, in Morrison, the Court invalidated a
tort cause of action established by the Violence Against Women Act, explaining that it would
require a chain of speculative assumptions to connect gender-motivated violence with interstate
commerce.  Neither of these measures played any role in a broader regulation of economic
activity.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.  Indeed, the “noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at
issue was central” to the Court’s decisions.  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610; see also Sabri, 541 U.S.
at 607.
The minimum coverage provision, in contrast, addresses quintessentially economic
activity by requiring health insurance as the means of payment for services in the interstate health
care market. It is part of a broad economic regulation of health care financing in the massive
interstate health care market, and it is essential to the Act’s guaranteed issue and community
rating reforms.  Moreover, the minimum coverage provision regulates economic conduct – the
means of payment for health care services in a market that accounts for over one-sixth of the
nation’s GDP.  Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of legislation that is more clearly economic.
Likewise, the “effect on insurance premiums” of the decision not to have health insurance “is not
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at all attenuated.”  Mead, 2011 WL 611139, at *16.  As noted, the Supreme Court has clearly
held that Congress may consider the effects of an entire class of conduct “in the aggregate.”
Raich, 545 U.S. at 22.  And, in the aggregate, the direct result of the decision to attempt to pay
for health care expenses out of pocket is that “Congress’s efforts to stabilize prices for [health
insurance] are thwarted.”  Mead, 2011 WL 611139, at *16.  Thus, “there is no need for
metaphysical gymnastics of the sort proscribed by Lopez” to understand the direct connection
between choosing to forego insurance, on the one hand, and cost-shifting – which is the very
thing that, according to Congress, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce – on the other. 
Thomas More, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 894.
Ultimately, the concerns underlying the Supreme Court’s decisions in Lopez and
Morrison are inapplicable here.  Those cases sought to avoid a view of economic causation so
broad that it would “‘obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local in the
activities of commerce.’”  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557) (further
quotation omitted).  In contrast, in United States v. Kukafka, 478 F.3d 531, 535 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 552 U.S. 866 (2007), the Third Circuit upheld the Deadbeat Parents Act because,
“although failure to pay child support might be a local activity, it is part of a national economic
problem that substantially affects interstate commerce.”  Similarly, in Pendleton, the Third
Circuit upheld a federal law that required sex offenders to register their current address even if
they never crossed state lines because sex offenders’ use of interstate travel to escape detection
was a national problem, and the registration requirement was a reasonably adapted means of
tracking any sex offenders who might at some point travel interstate.  Pendleton, 636 F.3d at 88. 
This case is analogous to Kukafka and Pendleton, not to Lopez or Morrison.  The
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problems that are addressed by the Affordable Care Act are by no means local.  “The modern
health care system is highly interdependent and operates across state boundaries.”  Sara
Rosenbaum, Can States Pick Up the Health Reform Torch?, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. e29, at 3
(2010); see Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc., 313 F.3d 205, 213 (4th Cir. 2002)
(“Hospitals are regularly engaged in interstate commerce, performing services for out-of-state
patients and generating revenues from out-of-state sources.”) (citing Summit Health, Ltd. v.
Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 329-30 (1991)); Whited, 311 F.3d at 269 (problems in health care industry
“are not confined by the jurisdictional boundaries”).  As just one example, Pennsylvanians make
over 1500 emergency room visits each year to a hospital across state lines in West Virginia,
resulting in over $820,000 owed, and not yet paid, for visits that occurred in fiscal year 2007
alone.  Amicus Br. of the Governors of Washington, Colorado, Michigan, and Pennsylvania,
State of Florida v. HHS, No. 3:10-cv-91 (N.D. Fla. filed Nov. 19, 2010), at 9.  Congress
reasonably found that the Act’s national standards were required to ensure that employers and
individuals would not be subject to a state-by-state “patchwork of requirements and protections.”
 H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, pt. I, at 211-12 (2010).  The minimum coverage provision, a
quintessentially economic regulation, addresses national problems that arise in the context of a
vast interstate market.  It is a means reasonably adapted to that legitimate end.
This fact rebuts plaintiffs’ claim that upholding the minimum coverage provision –
regulating inactivity, in their parlance – obliterates any limitations on the Commerce Clause. 
Lopez and Morrison imposed limits that have nothing to do with “activity” or “inactivity.”  The
minimum coverage provision falls well within those boundaries, and upholding the provision
leaves them unaltered. 
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II. CONGRESS ENACTED THE MINIMUM COVERAGE PROVISION PURSUANT
TO ITS INDEPENDENT POWER UNDER THE GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE
Plaintiffs’ challenge fails for an additional reason.  Independent of its power under the
Commerce Clause, Congress has the “Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the
United States.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  Congress’s power to collect revenue and make
expenditures under the General Welfare Clause is “comprehensive.”  Charles C. Steward
Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 581 (1937); see also Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533,
541 (1869) (“[I]t was the intention of the Convention that the whole power should be conferred
….”).  Indeed, it is settled that Congress may use its general welfare authority for purposes
beyond its powers under other provisions of Article I.  See United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42,
44 (1950) (“Nor does a tax statute necessarily fall because it touches on activities which
Congress might not otherwise regulate.”); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 59-60 (1900)
(Congress may tax inheritances, even if it may not regulate them under the Commerce Clause);
Doremus, 249 U.S. at 94.  As long as a statute is “productive of some revenue,” Congress may
exercise its taxing powers irrespective of any “collateral inquiry as to the measure of the
regulatory effect of a tax.”  Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 514 (1937); see also United
States v. Grier, 354 F.3d 210, 215 (3d Cir. 2003).  In determining whether a Congressional
enactment is authorized under the taxing power, the only question is therefore whether the
regulation bears “some reasonable relation” to the “raising of revenue.”  United States v.
Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 93-94 (1919); see also J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276
U.S. 394, 412 (1928) (“motive” and “effect” “to secure revenue” bring measure within taxing
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power, even if Congress announces other motives to regulate commerce).  
The minimum coverage provision falls within Congress’s comprehensive General
Welfare Clause authority.  The Affordable Care Act requires “taxpayers” not otherwise exempt
to obtain “minimum essential coverage” or pay a penalty.  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a), (b)(1). 
“Taxpayers” who are not required to file income tax returns for a given year are not subject to
this provision.  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(2).  If the penalty applies, the taxpayer must report it on his
income tax return for the taxable year, as an addition to his income tax liability.  26 U.S.C. §
5000A(b)(2).  The resulting penalty is a percentage of the taxpayer’s household income, subject
to a floor and a cap of the national average premium for the lowest-tier plans offered in the new
Exchanges for the taxpayer’s family size.  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c)(1), (2).  The taxpayer’s
responsibility for his family members turns on their status as dependents under the Internal
Revenue Code.  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a), (b)(3).  The Secretary of the Treasury is empowered to
enforce the provision, and he collects the penalty in the same manner as other assessable
penalties under the Internal Revenue Code.  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(g).  2
Because the provision, where it applies, will increase a taxpayer’s total liability, there can
be no dispute that the provision will be “productive of some revenue.” Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at
514.  Indeed, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that $4 billion in revenues will be
derived each year from the provision when it is fully in effect.  Letter from Douglas W.
Elmendorf, Director, CBO, to the Hon. Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives 2
tbl. 4.  (Mar. 20, 2010). 
  The Secretary of the Treasury may not collect the penalty through notice of federal tax2
liens or levies, and may not bring a criminal prosecution for a failure to pay it.  26 U.S.C. §
5000A(g)(2). 
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Beyond that determinative fact, the provision operates as a tax in every meaningful sense,
that is, as a “pecuniary burden laid upon individuals or property for the purpose of supporting the
government.”  United States v. New York, 315 U.S. 510, 515-16 (1942).  Congress placed the
provision in the Internal Revenue Code; directed that the amount a taxpayer owes under the
provision be reported on the taxpayer’s annual tax return and added to the taxpayer’s annual tax
liability; and granted enforcement authority to the Secretary of the Treasury.  Revenues from the
provision go to the general treasury.  In all practical respects, the provision is a taxing measure. 
Cf. In re Chateaugay Corp., 53 F.3d 478, 498 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Coal Act was at least partially an
exercise of the taxing power,” given placement in Internal Revenue Code and grant of
enforcement authority to Treasury). 
The only basis that has been offered for refusing to recognize the minimum coverage
provision as a valid taxing measure relies on the fact that Congress did not label the § 5000A
penalty as a “tax.”  But the substance of the provision, not its label, is dispositive.  Penn Mut.
Indem. Co. v. Comm’r, 277 F.2d 16, 20 (3d Cir. 1960) (“the tax itself” need not “bear an accurate
label” in order to be upheld as a valid taxing measure).  The Supreme Court has emphasized that,
“[i]n passing on the constitutionality of a tax law [the Court is] concerned only with its practical
operation, not its definition or the precise form of descriptive words which may be applied to it.” 
Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 363 (1941) (internal quotation omitted); see also
United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 275 (1978) (funds owed by operation of Internal Revenue
Code had “essential character as taxes” despite statutory label as “penalty”).  
Indeed, general constitutional principles establish that Congress was under no obligation
to identify the § 5000A as a tax or otherwise expressly invoke the General Welfare Clause in
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order to enact legislation pursuant to its taxing power.  “‘The constitutionality of action taken by
Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise.’”  United
States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 178 n.14 (2d Cir. 20002) (quoting Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co.,
333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948)); see also Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 131 F.3d 353, 358 (3d Cir. 1997) (Congress’s “failure to explain fully the
constitutional justification for its enactment does not invalidate [a statute], for Congress is not
required to discuss or explain explicitly the constitutional basis for laws that it enacts”); Usery v.
Charleston C. School Dist., 558 F.2d 1169, 1171 (4th Cir. 1977) (court’s “duty in passing on the
constitutionality of legislation is to determine whether Congress had the authority to adopt the
legislation,” not whether Congress invoked that authority or even whether it intended to do so). 
Even if Congress’s intent or express references were relevant, however, there is ample
basis to uphold the provision as a valid tax.  In all, the word “tax” or a derivative of it appears
more than forty times in the minimum coverage provision.  Placing the provision in the Tax
Code, requiring that compliance be reported on the tax return, providing that any penalties be
paid every April 15 with income taxes, and referring repeatedly to the obligations of the taxpayer
are all clear indicators that Congress intended the provision to operate as a tax.  Moreover, the
taxing power was expressly invoked in the Senate to defeat constitutional points of order against
the provision.  155 Cong. Rec. S13,830, S13,832 (Dec. 23, 2009).  During the floor debates,
Congressional leaders explicitly defended the provision as an exercise of the taxing power.  See,
e.g., 156 Cong. Rec. H1882 (Mar. 21, 2010) (statement of Rep. Miller); 156 Cong. Rec. H1824,
H1826 (Mar. 21, 2010) (statement of Rep. Slaughter); 155 Cong. Rec. S13,751, S13,753 (Dec.
22, 2009) (statement of Sen. Leahy); 155 Cong. Rec. S13,581-82 (Dec. 20, 2009) (statement of
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Sen. Baucus).  Although there is no doubt on that score and no ambiguity arising because the
word “penalty” can apply not only to taxes, if there were such doubt or ambiguity, the
presumption of constitutionality would dictate that it be resolved in favor of upholding the
minimum coverage provision as an exercise of the taxing power.  United States v. Whitted, 541
F.3d 480, 492 (3d Cir. 2008) (Chagares, J., concurring) (recognizing that a Court “‘will construe
[a] statute to avoid [constitutional] problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the
intent of Congress’” (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const.
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 n.1 (1988))).
In sum, there is ample basis to conclude that Congress enacted the minimum coverage
provision as a valid exercise of its taxing power.  The provision operates as a tax; it applies only
to those required to file a federal tax return, and the penalty it imposes, if it applies, is an addition
to the taxpayer’s annual federal income tax liability.  The provision will generate substantial
revenues for the general treasury.  And, although there is no requirement that Congress recite the
constitutional source of authority that it proceeds under, in fact the taxing power was invoked
repeatedly during the debates on the Affordable Care Act as a source of authority for the
minimum coverage provision.  The provision is constitutional both as an exercise of the taxing
power and as an exercise of Congress’s authority to regulate interstate commerce. 
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, summary judgment should be entered in favor of
defendants.
DATED this 21st day of June, 2011. Respectfully submitted,
TONY WEST
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